Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford

Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford

2013 SCC 72
Supreme Court of Canada — Chief Justice McLachlin | December 20, 2013

Background

Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and Valerie Scott — current or former sex workers — challenged three Criminal Code provisions that criminalized activities around prostitution. While selling sex itself was legal in Canada, the law prohibited: keeping a "bawdy-house" (section 210), living on the avails of prostitution (section 212(1)(j)), and communicating in public for prostitution purposes (section 213(1)(c)). The women argued these laws violated their Charter rights by preventing them from taking basic safety measures — like hiring security guards, screening clients, or working indoors — that could protect them from violent customers.

The application judge agreed and struck down all three provisions. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decisions on the bawdy-house and living on avails provisions but found the communication ban was constitutional. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Did these provisions violate section 7 Charter rights to security of the person?
2. Were any violations justified under section 1 of the Charter?

The Security of Person Analysis

The Supreme Court found all three laws violated section 7 by creating a "sufficient causal connection" to increased danger for sex workers. The bawdy-house law prevented prostitutes from working in safer indoor locations and forced them onto dangerous streets. The living on avails provision was "overbroad" — while aimed at exploitative pimps, it caught everyone who provided services to prostitutes, including legitimate drivers, bodyguards, and receptionists. The communication ban prevented street workers from screening clients for violence or intoxication.

Crucially, the Court rejected the government's argument that sex workers "chose" these risks. Many prostitutes, the Court found, "have no meaningful choice but to do so" due to "financial desperation, drug addictions, mental illness, or compulsion from pimps." The violence of clients doesn't diminish "the role of the state in making a prostitute more vulnerable to that violence."

The Principles of Fundamental Justice

The Court found each law violated fundamental justice principles. The bawdy-house prohibition was "grossly disproportionate" — preventing community nuisance didn't justify the severe safety risks to prostitutes. The living on avails provision was "overbroad" because it captured clearly non-exploitative relationships like accountants or receptionists. The communication ban was also grossly disproportionate — the "possibility of nuisance caused by street prostitution" didn't justify preventing essential safety screening.

Key Takeaway

Laws that claim to protect vulnerable people but actually increase their danger violate the Charter's most fundamental guarantees.

While this case deals with Criminal Code provisions rather than Provincial Offences Act matters, it demonstrates how courts will scrutinize whether a law's actual effects match its stated purpose — and will strike down laws where the harm vastly outweighs any benefit.