Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) v Dies

Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) v. Dies

2018 ONCJ 641
Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial Offences Appeal) — Justice Marcella Henschel | September 21, 2018

Background

Stephen Dies was a chiropractor whose license was suspended in 1998 and revoked in 2000. Despite a 2006 Superior Court order prohibiting him from using the title "doctor" or "chiropractor," Dies continued treating patients and billing insurance companies. In February 2013, he signed a chiropractic "treatment confirmation form" for patient Tanya Van Leeuwen's insurance claim to RBC, representing himself as a licensed chiropractor when he wasn't.

RBC's claims investigator Michelle Davidson discovered the fraud and reported it to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) in April 2013. Dies was charged under section 447(2)(a.3) of the Insurance Act with making false statements to obtain insurance payments. What should have been a straightforward fraud case turned into a two-year legal marathon when Dies launched multiple frivolous challenges.

Issues

1. Whether the information was laid outside the limitation period under section 449 of the Insurance Act
2. Whether section 449 violated Dies' Charter rights under sections 7 and 11(d)
3. Whether the 24-month delay from charge to judgment violated Dies' section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time

The Limitation Period Challenge

Dies argued that section 449 of the Insurance Act created a two-year limitation period from the date of the offense, making the April 2015 information invalid since the offense occurred in February 2013. The court thoroughly rejected this interpretation. Section 449 clearly states proceedings cannot commence more than two years after "the date on which the facts upon which the proceedings are based first came to the knowledge of the Superintendent." Since FSCO received the complaint on April 11, 2013, and the information was sworn April 2, 2015, the Crown was well within the limitation period. Justice Henschel found Dies' interpretation "entirely baseless and illogical" and noted the French version of the statute made the knowledge-based limitation crystal clear.

The Charter Challenge Fails

Dies claimed section 449 was unconstitutionally vague and violated his Charter rights. The court found his section 7 rights weren't even engaged because imprisonment wasn't available for this offense, and the remote possibility of jail for non-payment of fines was too speculative. Even if section 7 applied, section 449 provided clear guidance — it's explicitly tied to when the Superintendent learns of the facts, not when the offense occurred. Justice Henschel noted that discoverability-based limitation periods are common and constitutional, especially for regulatory offenses where violations might remain hidden.

The Delay Application Backfires

Dies claimed the 24-month delay from charge to judgment violated his section 11(b) rights under the Jordan framework. This argument spectacularly backfired. Justice Henschel found that Dies caused most of the delay through frivolous motions — the failed limitation challenge, the meritless constitutional challenge, and inadequate time estimates for trial. Subtracting defense-caused delay left only 14 months and 6 days of "resulting delay," well under the 18-month Jordan ceiling. The court characterized Dies' motions as having "no foundation in law or fact" and noted they "substantially lengthened the proceedings."

Key Takeaway

Frivolous Charter applications and limitation challenges will backfire — courts will deduct defense-caused delay when calculating whether your trial took too long.

Dies turned what could have been a straightforward guilty plea into a two-year ordeal, ultimately facing the same $10,000 fine he would have received initially. Self-represented defendants should carefully evaluate whether their Charter challenges have merit before filing them, as courts have no patience for "meritless" applications that waste judicial resources.