R v Aransevia

R. v. Aransevia

Ontario Court of Justice — Justice R. Khawly | November 21, 2002
Ontario Court of Justice

Background

Fitz Aransevia was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act. At trial, a police officer testified that he was operating a LTI Marksman 2020 laser speed measuring device. The officer stated: "I am also a trained and qualified radar and laser speed measuring officer and I was using a LTI Marksman 2020 measuring unit which is capable of measuring the speed of a moving vehicle. This was tested and found to be working by myself."

The Justice of the Peace convicted Aransevia, reasoning that he could "draw some reasonable conclusions" from the officer's testimony. The JP concluded that when the officer said he "tested" the device, this must have meant he tested it both before and after his shift on the day in question, in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Aransevia appealed this conviction.

Issues

1. Was there sufficient evidence that the laser device was tested both before and after use?
2. Can a trial court make reasonable inferences about testing procedures, or does this amount to speculation?

The Laser Testing Requirement

Justice Khawly examined recent Court of Appeal authority, particularly the Vancrie decision, which established that to prove a laser device was working properly, the Crown must show the device was tested both before and after use on the day in question. The court reviewed several cases where this standard was met — in each case, officers gave specific testimony like "I had tested the device prior to setting it up on that date and after taking it down and found it to be in proper working order."

In this case, however, all the Crown had was the officer's vague statement that the device "was tested and found to be working by myself." There was no evidence of when this testing occurred, what kind of testing was done, or whether it happened both before and after the speed measurement. Justice Khawly ruled that for a trial court to infer that proper before-and-after testing occurred would require "reading in evidence that is not before the Court."

Reasonable Inference vs. Speculation

The key issue was whether the Justice of the Peace could reasonably conclude that proper testing had occurred based on the officer's general statement. Justice Khawly held this crossed the line from reasonable inference into impermissible speculation. The court noted: "Just because one is an experienced officer doesn't necessarily give the trier of fact licence to read in words that are not there." The Crown's evidence simply did not establish the required foundation for laser speed measurement evidence.

Key Takeaway

Vague testimony about "testing" a laser device is not enough — the Crown must prove specific before-and-after testing procedures.

If you're facing a laser speeding charge, examine whether the officer's testimony specifically addresses when and how the device was tested. Generic statements about testing may not meet the legal standard required for conviction.