R v Doroz

R. ex rel. City of Toronto v. Doroz

2011 ONCJ 281
Ontario Court of Justice — Justice Libman | May 30, 2011

Background

Bartosz Doroz was caught speeding 57 km/h in a 40 km/h zone. At trial, the prosecutor agreed to let him plead guilty to the reduced speed of 50 km/h in a 40 km/h zone, which carried a set fine of $25. But Justice of the Peace Anstey had other ideas. She knew about the Winlow case from the Court of Appeal, which said judges can't reduce speeding fines below the amounts set out in section 128(14) of the Highway Traffic Act. So instead of imposing the $25 fine, she suspended Doroz's sentence entirely — meaning he paid nothing.

The prosecutor objected, pointing out that Winlow said there's no jurisdiction to reduce fines. The justice of the peace's response? 'You like Mr. Winlow, I say I trump him.' The City of Toronto appealed, arguing that suspended sentences for speeding tickets aren't legally available.

Issues

1. Can a court impose a suspended sentence for a speeding offence, given that Winlow prohibits reducing set fines?
2. Do speeding fines qualify as 'minimum penalties' that trigger relief under section 59 of the Provincial Offences Act?
3. Was it appropriate to suspend the sentence in this specific case?

The Minimum Penalty Analysis

Justice Libman ruled that speeding fines are minimum penalties, even though they're calculated by a mathematical formula. His reasoning: every person guilty of the same speeding offence gets the identical fine — it can't be higher or lower than the set amount. In Doroz's case, everyone who speeds 10 km/h over the limit pays exactly $25, 'no more, no less.' This creates what he called 'a fixed penalty where the minimum and maximum coincide.'

The judge relied heavily on R. v. Dilorenzo, where the Court of Appeal found that a three-year licence suspension was a minimum penalty even though it wasn't expressed as 'not less than three years.' If a penalty is fixed at a specific amount with no discretion to vary it, it's effectively a minimum penalty that can trigger section 59(2) relief.

Section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act allows courts to either impose a fine 'less than the minimum or suspend the sentence' when exceptional circumstances make the minimum penalty unduly oppressive. The word 'or' is crucial — suspension is an alternative form of relief, not a reduction of the fine amount.

The Process Problem

While Justice Libman agreed that suspended sentences are legally available for speeding, he found that Justice of the Peace Anstey made serious procedural errors. She proceeded directly to sentencing without allowing the parties to make submissions as required by section 57(1) of the Provincial Offences Act. More importantly, she imposed the suspended sentence simply to circumvent Winlow, not because exceptional circumstances existed. The judge emphasized that section 59(2) relief requires 'exceptional circumstances' where imposing the fine 'would be unduly oppressive or otherwise not in the interests of justice' — a very high standard.

Key Takeaway

Courts can suspend sentences for speeding tickets, but only in truly exceptional circumstances — not as a routine way around set fines.

This case establishes that while Winlow prevents fine reductions, suspended sentences remain available under section 59(2) for defendants who can prove exceptional hardship. However, courts must follow proper procedure and apply the stringent test, making suspended sentences rare exceptions rather than common alternatives to paying speeding fines.