R v Faria
Unreported
Provincial Offences Court
Added December 14, 1987
When the police officer said the driver 'identified himself to myself and the other officer as the driver,' the judge had two words for that evidence — voir dire.
Summary
Her Majesty The Queen v. Filipe Faria
[1987] Brampton Provincial Offences Court
Provincial Offences Court — Judge K.A. Langdon | December 14, 1987
Background
Filipe Faria was charged with careless driving under section 111 of the Highway Traffic Act after his vehicle crashed into a tree on someone's lawn at 346 Tedwyn Drive. When police arrived at the scene, they found Faria's car with severe front-end damage, still in collision with the tree, with the back wheels on someone's driveway. The only evidence linking Faria as the driver came from the police officer's testimony that Faria "identified himself to myself and the other officer as the driver" at the scene.
At trial, the crown relied entirely on this statement to prove that Faria was driving the vehicle. However, no voir dire was conducted to determine whether this statement was admissible. Faria's agent appealed the conviction, arguing that the crown failed to establish a prima facie case on three grounds: improper identification evidence, inadmissible accident scene description, and lack of proof the accident occurred on a highway.
Issues
- Was the accused's statement identifying himself as the driver admissible without a voir dire?
- Did the crown establish sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of careless driving?
The Identification Statement Problem
The defence argued that under both the Criminal Code and Highway Traffic Act, anyone involved in a motor vehicle accident over $700 or with injuries must report the accident to police. This creates a statutory compulsion to provide information, and the case R. v. Slopek established that even statements compelled by statute must be subject to a voir dire to determine admissibility.
Judge Langdon agreed completely. He ruled that the prosecution was relying on "what essentially was a statement from the accused to prove identification of the accused as the driver of the car. That is a form of confession and although it may be highly inconvenient it has to be entered after a voir dire. There is no exception to that principle. It applies to anything relevant, including identification."
The crown prosecutor argued that requiring a voir dire for simple driver identification would jeopardize routine traffic prosecutions, but the judge rejected this argument. The principle applies universally to any statement that could incriminate the accused, regardless of how basic or routine it might seem.
Key Takeaway
Any statement by an accused person used to prove their guilt — even something as simple as "I was the driver" — requires a voir dire to determine admissibility.
If the crown tries to prove you were driving based on what you said at the scene, demand a voir dire. Without it, that evidence should be excluded, and if driver identification is the only evidence against you, the case should be dismissed.
Keywords
Details
Citation
Unreported
Source
Provincial Offences Court
Type
Case Law
Date Added
December 14, 1987