R v Godin

R. v. Godin

2009 SCC 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3
Supreme Court of Canada — Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Deschamps, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring) | June 4, 2009

Background

In May 2005, Marcel Godin was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and threatening to kill his ex-girlfriend. The Crown elected to proceed summarily, and trial was set for February 2006 — nine months later. Four days before trial, the Crown finally received DNA analysis of a vaginal swab taken from the complainant. The results didn't match Godin's DNA profile, potentially contradicting the complainant's hospital statement that she hadn't had intercourse for three days before the alleged assault.

Given this bombshell evidence, both sides agreed the Crown should re-elect to proceed by indictment so defence could explore the inconsistencies at a preliminary inquiry. The earliest available date was September 2006. Defence counsel wrote to the court and Crown proposing 31 alternative earlier dates — and got complete silence in response. When September arrived, the preliminary inquiry couldn't proceed due to insufficient court time and was rescheduled to February 2007. Trial was finally set for November 2007, thirty months after the original charges.

Issues

1. Whether a thirty-month delay violated Godin's section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time
2. Whether defence conduct contributed significantly to the delays
3. Whether prejudice to the accused could be inferred from the length of delay

The Crown's Unexplained Delays

The Supreme Court applied the framework from R. v. Morin, which sets guidelines of 8-10 months for institutional delay in provincial courts plus 6-8 months from committal to trial (total: 14-18 months). Godin's case blew past these guidelines by over a year, and Justice Cromwell found virtually all delay attributable to the Crown with no explanation offered.

Three critical failures doomed the prosecution: the unexplained nine-month delay in obtaining DNA analysis, the Crown's complete failure to respond to defence counsel's request for earlier preliminary inquiry dates, and the adjournment of the preliminary inquiry due to insufficient court time when the case was already in "obvious s. 11(b) difficulty." The Court rejected the Ontario Court of Appeal's finding that defence counsel significantly contributed to delays, noting that agreeing to a preliminary inquiry after late disclosure didn't waive the right to timely proceedings.

Prejudice and the Length of Delay

The Court emphasized that prejudice can be inferred from delay length alone — the longer the delay, the stronger the inference. Here, charges hung over Godin's head for over two years with restrictive bail conditions. There was also evidence of potential prejudice to his defence, as the case would likely turn on credibility and cross-examination of the complainant about DNA inconsistencies. The passage of time made effective cross-examination more difficult.

Key Takeaway

The Crown's duty to bring cases to trial within reasonable time includes responding to defence requests to expedite proceedings — silence in the face of obvious delay can violate Charter rights.

This case shows that even when disclosure issues arise, the Crown must actively work to minimize resulting delays and cannot ignore defence efforts to move cases forward faster.