R v May

R. v. May

[1990] M.J. No. 667
Manitoba Provincial Court, Criminal Division — Giesbrecht Prov. Ct. J. | December 17, 1990

Background

On a summer afternoon in 1989, Anthony May was driving his semi-trailer truck eastbound on Highway 1 near Brandon, Manitoba, hauling asphalt for Borland Construction. At approximately 3:30 p.m., without warning, May fell asleep at the wheel. His truck crossed the centerline and collided head-on with a westbound pickup truck, killing all three occupants: George Tudruk, Stephen Young, and Wesley Grant Wilson.

May had been working a normal construction day — he started between 5-6 a.m. and was about 10 hours into what was typically a 14-15 hour workday. There was no evidence of excessive speed, erratic driving, alcohol consumption, or visible signs of fatigue before the accident. Another Borland driver testified that May had been following at a safe distance and driving normally. May was charged with dangerous driving causing death.

Issues

1. Whether falling asleep while driving, by itself, establishes the necessary mens rea (guilty mind) for dangerous driving causing death
2. Whether expert evidence about involuntary sleep affects the legal analysis of driver culpability

The Mens Rea Requirement

The court faced conflicting case law on whether falling asleep alone proves dangerous driving. The Crown relied on cases like R. v. Longhurst, which held that drivers must know when they're becoming drowsy and should stop before falling asleep. But the defence pointed to R. v. Verma, which required "some indication of actual or constructive warning of fatigue" beyond just falling asleep.

The court heard expert testimony from Dr. David Koulack, a University of Manitoba psychology professor, who explained that people can fall asleep in mid-afternoon without prior awareness, especially during vulnerability windows (early morning and 2-5 p.m.). He testified that while a person feeling "wide awake" wouldn't suddenly fall asleep, someone experiencing normal sleepiness might not realize they were at risk of actually falling asleep — particularly if they'd never fallen asleep while driving before.

Judge Giesbrecht found the Verma approach more persuasive, noting that the Crown's case consisted "exclusively" of evidence that May fell asleep, with no proof he knew or should have known he was in danger of falling asleep. Unlike cases where drivers were awakened early, worked unreasonable hours, consumed alcohol, or showed visible signs of fatigue, May's situation presented none of these warning factors.

Key Takeaway

Falling asleep while driving doesn't automatically prove dangerous driving — the Crown must show the driver knew or should have known they were at risk of falling asleep.

This case establishes that inadvertent sleep, without warning signs or reckless behavior that created the risk, may not meet the mental element required for criminal driving offences, even when the consequences are tragic.