R v Potts

R. v. Potts

[2006] B.C.J. No. 849, 2006 BCSC 592
British Columbia Supreme Court — D.M. Smith J. | Heard April 3, 2006, Judgment April 13, 2006

Background

On September 19, 2004, Randall Richard Potts was driving northbound on the Coquihalla Highway near Kamloops when Constable Monson clocked his vehicle at 141 km/h using radar. The officer was positioned facing southbound, activated his radar gun, then made a U-turn to pursue and stop Potts' vehicle about five minutes later. Potts was issued a violation ticket for speeding contrary to a posted highway sign of 110 km/h under section 146(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act.

Potts disputed the ticket, putting the Crown to the strict proof of every element of the offence. At trial, the Justice of the Peace accepted the officer's evidence about Potts' speed over the defence witnesses, who had testified that Potts was driving the speed limit. However, the case turned on a different issue: whether the Crown had proven that speed limit signs were actually posted on that stretch of highway.

Issues

1. Whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Potts was speeding
2. Whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that regulatory speed limit signs were in place and unobstructed

The Missing Evidence of Speed Limit Signs

This case highlights a critical difference between section 146(1) and 146(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 146(1) creates presumptive speed limits (50 km/h in municipalities, 80 km/h outside), but section 146(3) requires proof that a posted sign was actually in place. Constable Monson testified that the signs "were in place" but when cross-examined, admitted he had no personal recollection of the incident and was relying solely on his "standard practice" of checking that signs were visible before setting up radar.

The problem was in the details. The officer never claimed he undertook this practice every time he set up radar — he simply described it as his general approach. The judge found this insufficient to establish the essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike certificate cases where an officer formally attests that signs were in place "throughout those hours of operation, on that date," Monson's vague reference to standard practice left room for reasonable doubt about whether he had actually verified the signs on this specific occasion.

Key Takeaway

For section 146(3) speeding charges, the Crown must prove that speed limit signs were actually posted — and an officer's vague testimony about "standard practice" isn't enough.

If you're charged under section 146(3), always put the Crown to the strict proof of sign placement. Ask the officer on cross-examination whether they have any specific recollection of checking the signs on your particular date, or whether they're just relying on general practice.