R v Racimore

R. v. Racimore

1975 CarswellOnt 1007, 25 C.C.C. (2d) 143
Ontario Supreme Court (High Court of Justice) — Grange J. | July 7, 1975

Background

On November 25, 1973, Racimore was driving his vehicle (license AZE 704) on Kenwood Avenue in Metropolitan Toronto around 12:30 P.M. His vehicle made contact with another parked car, but he had no idea the collision had occurred. Racimore simply continued driving, unaware that any accident had taken place. He was charged under section 140(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

Justice of the Peace G. Santacono convicted Racimore on February 19, 1974. The conviction was based on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hill v. The Queen, where a driver was aware of contact between vehicles but didn't know damage had resulted. Racimore's case was different — he genuinely had no knowledge that any contact had occurred at all.

Issues

1. Does section 140(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act require knowledge or awareness of involvement in an accident?
2. Is mens rea (guilty mind) required for this offence, or is it one of absolute liability?

The Knowledge Requirement

Justice Grange distinguished this case from Hill v. The Queen, noting that in Hill, the driver knew contact had occurred but was unaware of the extent of damage. Here, Racimore had zero knowledge of any contact whatsoever. The court found this distinction legally significant.

Grange J. referenced the Supreme Court's reasoning in R. v. King, noting that even statutory offences should not condemn involuntary conduct unless the legislation explicitly excludes any mental element. The court emphasized that mens rea relates to the mental processes that accompany voluntary conduct — and if someone genuinely doesn't know an accident occurred, their subsequent departure cannot be considered voluntary in any meaningful sense.

The judge noted that in normal circumstances involving serious damage, an accused would know contact occurred. However, Racimore's case presented "highly exceptional" circumstances where no such knowledge existed. The court concluded that without awareness of the accident, there could be no voluntary decision to leave the scene.

Key Takeaway

You cannot be convicted of failing to remain at an accident scene if you genuinely had no knowledge that an accident occurred.

This case establishes that section 140(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act requires some level of awareness or knowledge of involvement in an accident. Pure ignorance of the facts can be a complete defence, though such circumstances would be highly unusual in most collision scenarios.