R v Skeard

R. v. Skeard

[2003] O.J. No. 5853
Ontario Superior Court of Justice — Andre J. | December 11, 2003

Background

Brent Skeard was charged on September 18, 2002, in Mississauga with impaired driving and driving over .08 under section 253(b) of the Criminal Code. This was about as straightforward as drunk driving cases get — no Charter applications planned, no toxicologist being called by the defence, no voir dire needed. Just a simple trial that should have been wrapped up quickly.

Skeard appeared in court as required, retained lawyer David Howick by December 2002, and they set a judicial pre-trial for February 11, 2003. When they went to book the actual trial date, the earliest available slot was December 11, 2003 — a full ten months later. The only reason for this massive delay was institutional: the court system simply didn't have the resources to schedule trials any faster.

Issues

1. Whether a ten-month institutional delay violated Skeard's Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b)
2. Whether a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy given no evidence of actual prejudice

The Section 11(b) Analysis

The court applied the established four-part test for Charter delay violations: length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused. The Crown conceded that the ten-month period from February to December 2003 was purely institutional delay caused by lack of court resources.

Justice Andre looked to recent precedents, particularly R. v. Sharma from the Supreme Court of Canada, which set guidelines of eight to ten months as acceptable institutional delay for provincial court matters. More importantly, he cited R. v. Wadas (1992) and R. v. Meisner (2003), both from the same Peel region, which established that eight months was the norm, with nine months being "right at the margin" of what's constitutionally acceptable.

The judge was particularly struck by the chronic nature of delay problems in Peel. As he noted, the Askov decision was from 1990, Sharma from 1992, and yet here in 2003, a simple impaired driving case was still facing ten-month institutional delays. The system had over a decade to fix the problem and hadn't done so.

Key Takeaway

Even without proving specific harm, excessive court delays can kill a prosecution entirely.

While this was a Criminal Code case rather than a Provincial Offences Act matter, the principle applies broadly: defendants don't have to prove they were actually harmed by delays if the system takes unreasonably long to bring their case to trial. The courts will protect the right to timely justice even when there's no evidence of specific prejudice.