R v Slopek

R. v. Slopek

[1974] O.J. No. 826
Ontario Court of Appeal — Martin J.A., Gale C.J.O., Brooke J.A. | October 15, 1974

Background

Edward Slopek was charged under section 233(2) of the Criminal Code with failing to stop after an accident involving two bicycles driven by Catherine Robertson and Elizabeth Robertson on Pine Bush Road. The charge alleged that Slopek, having care and control of a vehicle involved in the accident, failed to stop, give his name and address, and offer assistance with intent to escape civil or criminal liability.

After receiving information about the accident, the investigating officer requested Slopek to attend at the police station. Slopek made a statement about his involvement in the accident. At his trial de novo, a voir dire was held to determine whether this statement was admissible. The trial judge found that while the statement was voluntary — meaning it wasn't induced by threats or promises from police — he nevertheless ruled it inadmissible because he felt bound by a previous case called R. v. Fex.

Issues

1. Was the trial judge correct in rejecting a voluntary statement made by the accused?
2. Did R. v. Fex require the Crown to prove the accused had care and control of the vehicle before admitting his statement?

The Misunderstanding of R. v. Fex

The trial judge believed he was bound by R. v. Fex to exclude Slopek's statement unless the Crown first proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Slopek actually had care and control of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeal found this was a complete misreading of the Fex case.

In R. v. Fex, Justice Addy was dealing with a different issue entirely: whether statements made under statutory compulsion (like Highway Traffic Act requirements to identify yourself) needed to meet the usual voluntariness test. The Crown in Fex argued that because drivers are legally required to give information at accident scenes, police didn't need to prove the statements weren't obtained through threats or promises. Justice Addy rejected this argument, holding that statutory obligations don't override the fundamental rule that statements to authorities must be voluntary.

But Justice Addy never said that voluntary statements were inadmissible — quite the opposite. The Court of Appeal clarified that once a statement is found to be voluntary (not induced by threats or promises), it should be admitted. The comment about proving care and control was merely Justice Addy pointing out that the statutory obligation only applies to people actually in control of vehicles in the first place.

Key Takeaway

A voluntary statement — one not obtained through threats, promises, or other improper inducements — is admissible evidence, even if made under legal compulsion.

This case reinforces the fundamental principle that the voluntariness test from Ibrahim v. The King remains the key standard for admitting statements made to persons in authority. If you make a statement to police that wasn't coerced, it can be used against you in court.