R v Soules

R. v. Soules

2011 ONCA 429
Court of Appeal for Ontario — LaForme, Sharpe, MacFarland JJ.A. | June 6, 2011

Background

Stephen Soules was driving in wet conditions when his vehicle rear-ended another car that was turning into a driveway. His car was then hit from behind by a third vehicle in a chain reaction collision. When Constable Bucci arrived to investigate, he spoke to each driver individually about what happened. Soules identified himself as the driver of his vehicle, believing he was legally required to do so under the Highway Traffic Act's accident reporting provisions.

Based on his observations and Soules' admission that he was driving, Constable Bucci suspected alcohol consumption and made an approved screening device demand. Soules failed the test, was arrested, and later provided breath samples reading 143 and 136 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood — well over the legal limit of 80. He was charged with impaired driving over 80.

Issues

1. Are statements compelled under Highway Traffic Act accident reporting requirements admissible in criminal proceedings?
2. Does using such statements to establish grounds for a breath demand violate Charter section 7 rights against self-incrimination?

The Self-Incrimination Protection

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, confirming that statements made under statutory compulsion cannot be used in criminal proceedings — not even for the limited purpose of establishing reasonable grounds for a breath demand. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. White and the BC Court of Appeal's ruling in R. v. Powers.

Highway Traffic Act sections 199 and 200 create legal obligations to report accidents and provide information to police. When someone honestly believes they're legally required to speak — as Soules did — that compelled statement violates Charter section 7 protection against self-incrimination. The Crown argued these statements should be admissible for the narrow purpose of justifying the breath demand, but the court rejected this distinction. As the Supreme Court held in White: "The protection afforded by the principle against self-incrimination does not vary based upon the relative importance of the self-incriminatory information sought to be used."

The Crown tried to distinguish this from cases like R. v. Thomsen, where breath test results can support grounds for further demands. But the court noted a crucial difference: in those cases, there's no legal compulsion to speak. A driver can refuse to answer questions even while being legally required to provide breath. Statutory accident reporting, however, eliminates that choice entirely.

Key Takeaway

If you believed you were legally required to tell police you were driving at an accident scene, that statement cannot be used against you in criminal court.

This protection applies even when police want to use your statement only to justify their investigation, not as direct evidence of guilt. The law recognizes that forcing someone to help build the case against themselves violates fundamental justice.