Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 (Stamicar Grievance)

Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 (Stamicar Grievance)

[2018] O.L.A.A. No. 287
Ontario Labour Arbitration — Arbitrator Robert J. Herman | August 23, 2018

Background

Iwona Stamicar was a City of Toronto prosecutor who worked out of Old City Hall, prosecuting municipal bylaws and provincial offences like Highway Traffic Act violations. In late spring 2012, she was approached by Brian Jones, a paralegal she knew professionally from his regular court appearances. Jones claimed they had made a plea deal months earlier — his client would plead to a lesser Highway Traffic Act charge (Section 170(12) interfering with traffic, carrying two demerit points) instead of the original Section 144(9) failing to obey a traffic sign (which carried three demerit points). Jones said his client had been convicted in absentia when he got tied up in another courtroom, and he wanted to reopen the matter to honour their alleged plea arrangement.

On August 17, 2012, Stamicar finished her court work at Old City Hall and walked with Jones to the Courts Administration Office at 137 Edward Street. What happened next was a masterclass in how not to handle a reopening application. Instead of following proper procedure, Stamicar used her prosecutor status to bypass the normal screening process, entered restricted areas using security codes, obtained original court documents directly from a Document Retrieval Clerk, and personally presented the case to a Justice of the Peace — all to expedite Jones's client's reopening application.

Issues

1. Did the grievor improperly leave her assigned workplace without authorization?
2. Did she abuse her prosecutorial status to circumvent required processes and provide preferential treatment?
3. Was discharge an appropriate penalty for her misconduct?

The Improper Assistance

The arbitrator found that while Stamicar's initial agreement to honour a plea deal wasn't inherently wrong, her execution was seriously flawed. She should have verified Jones's story by checking court records instead of blindly accepting his version of events. More importantly, she violated proper procedures in multiple ways: she used her security code to access restricted areas where she had no business being, directed a Document Retrieval Clerk to obtain original court documents for an improper purpose, and personally facilitated a reopening application outside normal channels.

The normal process required Jones to first see an Information Booth Clerk who would screen whether his client was entitled to reopen (applications are only available within 15 days of learning about a conviction, and only if fines remain unpaid). Jones's client didn't qualify — the fine had been paid over a year earlier. But Stamicar's intervention allowed Jones to skip this screening entirely and get his application directly before a Justice of the Peace.

The Arbitrator's Decision

While the arbitrator found serious misconduct, he rejected the City's discharge as excessive. Stamicar hadn't acted surreptitiously or for personal gain — she genuinely believed she was honouring a previous plea agreement. Her actions provided Jones with preferential treatment in terms of access, speed, and cost, but didn't involve deception or corruption of the judicial process itself. The Justice of the Peace still made an independent decision to grant the reopening and accept the plea.

The arbitrator noted this was an isolated incident by someone who immediately acknowledged her mistakes when confronted, apologized, and showed no likelihood of repeating such behavior. The City had also failed to have clear policies in place — they only changed security codes and issued new guidelines to staff after these events occurred.

Key Takeaway

Even well-intentioned attempts to expedite court processes can constitute serious professional misconduct when they provide unfair advantages.

For self-represented defendants, this case illustrates that reopening applications have strict eligibility requirements that exist for good reasons. If you've paid your fine and more than 15 days have passed since you learned of your conviction, your proper remedy is an appeal, not a reopening application — and no prosecutor should be helping you bypass those rules.